BackgroundSexual minority (SM) older adults experience mental health disparities. Psychiatric disorders and neuropsychiatric symptoms (NPS) are risk factors for cognitive decline. Although older people in same-sex (SSR) compared to mixed-sex relationships (MSR) perform more poorly on cognitive screening tests, prior studies found no differences in rates of dementia diagnosis or neuropsychological profiles. We sought to explore the role of NPS on neurocognitive outcomes for SM populations. We compared cognitive performance and structural brain parameters of older adults in SSR and MSR.MethodsData (...) were originally collected at Alzheimer's Disease Research Centers (ADRCs). Inclusion criteria were: age of 55+ years, a study partner identified as a spouse/partner, and availability of T1-MRI brain volumes/thickness. Participants were labeled as either SSR or MSR based on their/their co-participant's reported sex. We identified 1,073 participants (1,037 MSR−555 cognitively unimpaired [CU]; 36 SSR−23 CU) with structural MRI data, Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE), and Neuropsychiatric Inventory Questionnaire (NPI-Q) scores. A subset of the overall sample completed comprehensive neuropsychological assessment (n = 939; 908 MSR−494 CU; 31 SSR−22 CU). Covariates included in statistical models were age, sex, education, total intracranial volume, and apolipoprotein E genotype.ResultsMultivariate general linear models showed significant diagnosis-by-relationship interaction effects on the left parahippocampal gyrus volume. After stratification by relationship group, only cognitively impaired (CI) MSR had significantly smaller left parahippocampal volumes than MSR-CU. The SSR group showed better episodic memory performance. Severity of neuropsychiatric symptoms was negatively associated with volume/thickness of bilateral fronto-temporal areas and with MMSE scores, predominantly in the MSR group.ConclusionIn our study, MSR participants presented with a more compromised cognitive profile than SSR participants. MSR-CI participants showed significantly smaller left medio-temporal volumes, a neural signature of AD. Neuropsychiatric symptoms predicted smaller fronto-temporal volumes in the MSR more consistently than in the SSR group. These findings may be due to unexplored protective factors against cognitive decline in SM elders. Indeed, social support has been proposed as a protective factor warranting future investigation. (shrink)

The structure of traditional fiction is essentially linear or serial. No matter how complex a given work may be, it presents information to its reader successively, one element at a time, in a sequence determined by its author. By contrast, interactive fiction is parallel in structure or, more accurately, dendritic or tree-shaped. Not one, but several possible courses of action are open to the reader. Further, which one actually happens depends largely, though not exclusively, upon the reader’s own choices. To (...) be sure, the author is still in overall control, since it is she who has set up the particular nexus of events, but the route up the narrative tree, the actual sequence of events, is generally affected, if not completely determined, by the reader’s responses to that particular reader’s specific situation. In an adventure, the sequence of action frequently depends upon the reader’s decision to go in one geographical direction rather than another. In the eliza sample, the content of the “story” depends on such particulars as whether this reader has a brother or not, whether she fears her father, and why she has consulted the terminal. In general, the text presented to the eliza-reader depends on what that reader has already said and how the computer has interpreted and stored it, and this is generally true of interactive fiction.Further, interactive fiction is, in principle , open-ended—infinite. A conversation with eliza could go on for as long as one with Woody Allen’s psychoanalyst—in principle, forever. It has no necessary terminus. The program will go one writing texts and answers on the screen as long as the reader or player chooses to supply responses. Further, the computer can act as a metafictional narrator like John Barth or Thomas Pynchon who can create a story within a story or a story that generates another story within itself which generates another story within itself and so on, fictions dizzying and dazzling. One senses one’s essential humanity wobbling in the midst of the infinite paradoxes of existence and meaning. Anthony J. Niesz, assistant professor of German at Yale University, is the author of Dramaturgy in German Drama: From Gryphius to Goethe . He is interested in the phenomenon of the meta-theater, especially in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German drama, as well as in the literature and cultural policies of the German Democratic Republic. Norman N. Holland is Milbauer Eminent Scholar at the University of Florida. He is the author of Laughing and The I. (shrink)

BackgroundBurnout is being experienced by medical students, residents, and practicing physicians at significant rates. Higher levels of Hardiness and Emotional Intelligence may protect individuals against burnout symptoms. Previous studies have shown both Hardiness and Emotional IntelIigence protect against detrimental effects of stress and can be adapted through training; however, there is limited research on how training programs affect both simultaneously. Therefore, the objective of this study was to define the association of Hardiness and Emotional Intelligence and their potential improvement through (...) hyper realistic immersion simulation training in military medical students.MethodsParticipants in this study consisted of 68 second year medical students representing five medical schools who were concurrently enrolled in the United States military scholarship program. During a six day hyper-realistic surgical simulation training course, students rotated through different roles of a medical team and responded to several mass-casualty scenarios. Hardiness and Emotional Intelligence were assessed using the Hardiness Resilience Gauge (HRG) and the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I 2.0) respectively, at two time points: on arrival (pre-event) and after completion of the course (post-event).ResultsHardiness and Emotional Intelligence scores and sub scores consistently improved from pre-event to post-event assessments. No difference in training benefit was observed between genders but differences were observed by age where age was more often associated with Emotional Intelligence. In addition, factor analysis indicated that the HRG and EQ-I 2.0 assessment tools measured predominately different traits although they share some commonalities in some components.ConclusionThis study indicates that Hardiness and Emotional Intelligence scores can be improved through immersion training in military medical students. Results from this study support the use of training course interventions and prompt the need for long term evaluation of improvement strategies on mitigating burnout symptoms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narrative Symposium:Conflicting Interests in MedicineLaura Jean Bierut, Sal Cruz-Flores, Laura E. Hodges, Anthony A. Mikulec, Govind K. Nagaldinne, Erine L. Bakanas, John F. Peppin, Joel S. Perlmutter, William H. Seitz Jr., Edward Diao, Andre N. Sofair, and David M. Zientek• To Recruit or Not to Recruit for a Clinical Trial• An Unexpected Lesson• Am I on call for the entire Midwest?• Why is Medicare Wasting Away?• The Downside (...) of the Informed Consent Juggernaut• Expert Testimony at the Food and Drug Administration: Who Wants the Truth?• Crossroads: The Intersection of Personal, Professional Society, and Industry Relationships• A Change of Heart• The Evolution of Conflicts of Interest in a New Subspecialty: A Case Study of the Development of Interventional CardiologyCopyright © 2011 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This paper pr o vides an o v e r vi e w of the themes presented in Bentha m ' s w ork Scotch Reform -a n e w w ork being prepared for pu b lication from Bentha m ' s manuscripts b y Oxford Un i v ersity Press as pa r t of the Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Attention is focused on the relationship bet w een the system of l e g al procedure proposed (...) and the under l ying principle of utili t y . T w o issues are highlighte d , the nature of Bentha m ' s anti-nomian thesis for c i vil cou r ts and the parad o x of requiring restraint on the judicial control of c i vil procedure, w hilst simultaneous l y rem o ving all r ules of action and all o wing increased judicial discretion. (shrink)

Although accounts of evolutionary altruism which leave the question of whether altruism can evolve in nature open to empirical confirmation/refutation have been worked out for special (two-trait) cases, no real effort has been made to work out such accounts for general (N-trait) cases. It is tempting to take this lack of attention as evidence for an inextricably conventional element, which precludes such accounts from being of practical scientific value. I argue that such accounts do generalize in a natural way. As (...) is often the case in science, generalizing theoretically simplified notions is not straightforward because of issues hidden in the special case. These issues do not, however, turn out to be essentially conventional. (shrink)

Woods et al. (2015) claim that secular Simple Reaction Time (SRT) slowing (Woodley et al. 2013), disappears once modern studies are corrected for software and hardware lag, and once Galton’s data are corrected for fastest-response selection. Here, this is challenged with a reanalysis of the secular slowing of SRT in the UK amongst large (N>500), population-representative age-matched (≊18-30 years) studies. Starting with Galton’s sample, this is assigned the simulated value estimated by Dodonova and Dodonov (2013, who like Woods et al. (...) were critical of secular SRT slowing, owing to measurement issues) on the basis that he collected the fastest of three trials (207.5ms). The two sexes in Galton’s study are combined (as in Woods et al.), raising the weighted sample mean to 208.5ms. Next is the Wilkinson and Alison (1989) study, which attempted to replicate Galton’s study one century later, collecting SRTs as part of an exhibit in the London Science Museum. An electronic chronoscope recorded SRTs on magnetic tape, and sampled over eight trials with micro-processor-determined variable foreperiods. The mean SRT value for the 1,189 participants aged between 20 and 29 is 245ms. The presence of long and variable foreperiods necessitates a penalty of 10ms (Dodonova & Dodonov, 2013). Another 10ms should be deducted based on key-pressing time (Dodonova & Dodonov, 2013), reducing the mean to 225ms. The studies of Deary and Der (2005) and Der and Deary (2006) are also included. The first utilized the highly representative Scottish Twenty-07 cohort. Dodonova and Dodonov (2013) identified a 53ms lag stemming from liquid crystal stimulus onset delay. This is subtracted from the weighted average of the two sexes (300.8ms), along with another 10ms for key-pressing time. The resultant mean is 237.8ms.Dodonova and Dodonov (2013) cleaned the male data in the Der and Deary (2006) study, collected from the representative UK Health and Lifestyle Survey, by removing cases for which SRT standard deviations exceeded those for choice RT. This reduced the N from 834 to 661, and also reduced the mean from 300ms to 284ms. The estimate was also penalized for LCD onset delay and key-pressing time, reducing the mean to 221ms. When the SRT value for the female sample is penalized equivalently the resulting value is 239ms. In order to simulate the female N for the purposes of taking a weighted average of both sexes, the actual female N is reduced in proportion to the male N (79.3%=881), yielding a weighted mean of 230.9ms for a combined sample-size of 1,472. Table 1 presents the data used in the analysis.Table 1 SRT means, sample sizes and sampling years for four large, age-matched UK samples[Table 1 here]Consistent with Dodonova and Dodonov (2013), N-weighted regression is employed, as the only data on sample variability is sample size. Figure 1 illustrating the secular trend in UK SRT over 100 years.[Figure 1 here] Figure 1. Secular SRT slowing across four large, representative studies from the UK spanning a century. Bubble-size is proportional to sample size. Combined N=6,622. The secular slowing between UK studies is statistically significant (β=0.97; 95% CI=0.969 to 0.971, N=6,622), at –22.8ms a century. Additional evidence for generational SRT slowing comes from Verhaeghen (2014), who suggested that the ratio of longitudinal to cross-sectional age-related slowing might tentatively infer generational changes in processing speed. Verhaeghen reports ratios for two SRT studies (0.91 and 1.15), implying both secular losses and gains. For the study of Deary and Der (2005), the SRT ratios are “censored because they were excessively large” (p. 256). In this study, the ratio of the cross-sectional slowing trend (taking the weighted average of all paired between-cohort differences rescaled in terms of change per decade for males and females), to the weighted average decadal longitudinal slowing trend for both the males and females is 0.73, for an N of 1,926 (cf. Woodley et al., 2014b, for a detailed reanalysis of this dataset). The weighted average of the three SRT ‘Verhaeghen ratios’ is 0.9 (N=4,078) – tentatively consistent with generational declines (i.e. a ratio of <1). In conclusion Woods et al. (2015) have undoubtedly made an important contribution to the debate concerning the role of software and hardware lag in the inflation of contemporary estimates of SRT, however the evidence for generational SRT slowing remains quite compelling. ReferencesDeary, I.J., & Der, G. (2005). Reaction time, age, and cognitive ability: Longitudinal findings from age 16 to 63 years in representative population samples. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 12, 187–213.Der, G., & Deary, I.J. (2006). Age and sex differences in reaction time in adulthood: Results from the United Kingdom Health Lifestyle Survey. Psychology and Aging, 21, 62–73.Dodonova, Y.A., & Dodonov, Y.S. (2013). Is there any evidence of historical slowing of reaction time? No, unless we compare apples and oranges. Intelligence, 41, 674–687.Galton, F. (1890). Exhibition of instruments (1) for testing the perception of differences of tint, and (2) for determining reaction-time. Journal of the Anthropological Institute, 19, 27–29.Verhaeghen, P. (2014). The elements of cognitive aging: Meta-analyses of age-related differences in processing speed and their consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Wilkinson, R.T., & Allison, S. (1989). Age and simple reaction time: Decade differences for 5,324 subjects. Journal of Gerontology, 44, 29–35.Woodley, M.A., Madison, G., & Charlton, B.G. (2014b). Possible dysgenic trends insimple visual reaction time performance in the Scottish Twenty-07 cohort: Areanalysis of Deary & Der (2005). Mankind Quarterly, 55, 110-124.Woodley, M.A., te Nijenhuis, J., & Murphy, R. (2013). Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time. Intelligence, 41, 843–850.Woods, D.L., Wyma, J.M., Yund, E.W., Herron, T.J., & Reed, B. (2015). Factors influencing the latency of simple reaction time. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9:131. (shrink)

Shah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available (...) to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism. (shrink)

Sartre draws a sharp distinction between consciousness, on the one hand, and inner sense or knowledge of (it)self, on the other: ‘La conscience n’est pas un mode de connaisance particullier, appelé sens intime ou connaisance de soi’ (B& N: 7). I explore in detail the meaning of the terms involved in that distinction with a view to highlight its significance.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cicero the Advocate, and: The Roman World of Cicero's De OratoreAnthony CorbeillJonathan Powell and Jeremy Paterson, eds. Cicero the Advocate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. xii + 448 pp. Cloth, $150.Elaine Fantham. The Roman World of Cicero's De Oratore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 354 pp. Cloth, $120.Emphasis falls emphatically on "advocate" in the fine Powell and Paterson collection. Each essay concentrates on the forensic speeches (...) and the various strategies that Cicero employs "to ensure that the person he represents is acquitted or that the person he is prosecuting is found guilty" (from the dust jacket, the only place advocacy is defined). Well-organized and unusually coherent (given the genre), all of Cicero the Advocate can be read with profit.The book has three parts: an "editorial introduction," "themes," and "case studies." The concise and accurate introduction (1–57) provides a context for understanding Roman forensic oratory. Topics include a helpful comparison between Greek, Roman, and modern expectations; the mechanics of the Roman courts; the role of rhetorical theory in the construction of Cicero's orations; and, [End Page 144] finally, a review of the possible relationship between Cicero's published and original speeches. Indeed, the coverage is so comprehensive that it occasionally overlaps unnecessarily with the treatment of individual contributors (e.g., Lintott, Burnand, Laws).Needless polemics, however, tend to mar the introduction's tone. In advocating advocacy, the editors adopt a Ciceronian rhetoric of deniability, attacking a position that a subsequent statement grudgingly acknowledges. For example, the editors note early on: "Reading the work of some recent scholars [one relevant eighteen-page essay is cited], one might think that a Roman law court was a place in which all kinds of considerations, personal, social, or political, mattered more than the legal and factual points that the court was supposed to be deciding" (3). Before one can ponder this assessment of recent scholarship on Cicero (characteristic of "the individualistic 1980s" [3, n. 11]), the next paragraph begins, "Nobody, of course [my emphasis], denies that the outcome of a trial—in any legal system—can sometimes be affected by extraneous (especially political) issues." So perhaps these "recent scholars" are worth reading after all; indeed, the study of the cultural background that contributes to persuasion certainly warrants consideration in a book on advocacy. Fortunately, the individual contributions that follow adopt a more conciliatory tone.The range and number of essays preclude active engagement, so in what follows I will summarize key issues. After a survey of "Legal Procedure in Cicero's Time" (61–78) by Andrew Lintott, Jeremy Paterson's "Self-Reference in Cicero's Forensic Speeches" (79–95) assesses the oratorical function of self-praise. Attributing this practice to the original role of the patronus (80), Paterson identifies the advertisement of wealth and status as an important element of Roman advocacy, necessarily changing in tone for Cicero as his own status increases. Paterson's fine analysis, however, would need to change if applied to non-forensic speeches, in which Ciceronian self-praise is particularly pronounced. This surely would affect his conclusion that "Cicero never forgot what he was about, which was to win the case for his client" (95). In the dramatically titled "A Volscian Mafia? Cicero and his Italian Clients in the Forensic Speeches" (97–116; "mafia" refers simply to "local networks of obligations and contacts," 114), Kathryn Lomas surveys the role of Italian communities in five of Cicero's works (Pro Roscio Amerino, Pro Cluentio, Pro Caecina, Pro Caelio, Pro Plancio) to try to discover why there is a "relatively low level of visibility" of Italians even in those cases in which such connections are vital (98). The Italians defended by Cicero fall into two categories: municipals who, like Cicero, seek prominence in Rome (Caelius, Plancius), and the wealthy who have key connections within the capital but do not seek political office in Rome (Roscius, Cluentius, Oppianicus). Lomas convincingly demonstrates that Cicero defends clients from regions where he could hope for political support (especially in southern Latium). In "Reading Cicero's Narratives" (117–46), D. S. Levene employs a reader-response approach to the narrationes of three speeches (Pro Roscio... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON DISORDERED PLEASURES AND CONDITIONS ANTHONY c. DALY, S.J. St. Louis University St. Louis, Missouri IT IS A COMMONPLACE that various philosophies, besides being supremely important intellectually and morally to individuals, have exercised a powerful influence on culture through their proponents acting individually and in schools. Sometimes, too, philosophers and theologians made venerable by antiquity are cited in policy disputes, both secular and ecclesiastical, which have a (...) definite political aspect. The obvious hope is that the struggle can be won more easily with the added support of a revered authority. This seems to have been the case recently in the debate over homosexuality. Bruce Williams, O.P., wrote a commentary 1 on a letter from the Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, " On the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons," in which he adopts the position that the homosexual condition cannot be considered "all right". He bases his argument explicitly on the scholastic maxim ' agere sequitur esse' (acting fol.., lows being) ; if the action is distorted, so is the condition from which it follows. But in disputing this position another commentator on the Roman letter, Gerald D. Coleman, S.S.,2 has named Thomas Aquinas as a key scholastic philosopher who should logically be counted as his own ally. Coleman seems to say 1 "Homosexuality: The New Vatican Statement," Theological Studies 48(1987), pp. 259-77. My thanks to Jesuit Fathers Harry R. Kloeker, Robert W. Mulligan, and David A. Wayne for advice and encouragement during the preparation of this article. 2 "The Vatican Statement on Homosexuality,'' Theological Studies 48(1987), pp. 727-34. 583 584 ANTHONY C. DALY, S.J. that although Thomas" would name the homosexual activity... as ' distorted '," he would not think of the homosexual condition in this way.3 Before entering in detail into Thomas's actual thought on the matter, it seems important for humanitarian reasons to note specifically, as did the Roman Letter, Williams, Coleman, and Thomas himself, that a disordered condition need not imply moral culpability. The case is clearer when the disordered condition is a physical handicap.4 In that case it isn't morally wrong to be handicapped, yet it isn't " all right " to be physically handicapped either, except insofar as "it's all right" means that a person would rightly accept and love himself or herself, handicap and all. A disordered condition may involve a physical evil or perhaps a psychological evil, but does not necessarily involve a culpable moral evil. With this proviso the way is open for a frank discussion of Thomas's actual ideas about homosexuality. They are certainly worth the consideration of any contemporary philosopher or theologian who might be interested in this issue, and for others the subject involves a facet of the history of ideas well worth noting, expecially since from this angle it is easy to focus on Thomas's general thought about disordered conditions and pleasures. The investigation also forms a case study in the way Thomas used philosophy in forming and articulating his theology. Here, despite the fact that much of the material as Thomas expressed it has a theological formality and purpose, it is from philosophy that he derives his arguments, their thought structure, and their underlying insight. Pleasures, Actions, Habits, and States In order to help him refute Williams's point that a homosexual 8 Coleman, "Statement," pp. 732-34 (quotation from p. 733); Williams, "Homosexuality," pp. 263-69. 4 See Williams, " Homosexuality," p. 266, quoting Marc Oraison, The Homosexual Question (London: Search, 1977), p. 115; Coleman, " Statement," p. 734 and n. 30 (Coleman does not think of homosexuality as a distorted condition). Thomas's thought on the matter is treated below. AQUINAS ON DISORDERED PLEASURES, CONDITIONS 585 orientation is a disordered condition, Coleman quotes Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, 31, 7.5 Coleman argues that Thomas had no idea of the contemporary notion of " homosexual orientation", but were he aware of it or something like it, he would logically have to call homosexual acts distorted, but would not call the homosexually oriented person distorted. This seems to mean Thomas would not call the homosexual orientation objectively disordered.6 Coleman's use of... (shrink)

Avicenna holds that since God has existed from all eternity and is immutable and impassible, he cannot come to have an attribute or feature that he has not had from all eternity. He also claims for the simultaneous causation. A puzzle arises when we consider God’s creating this world. If God is immutable and impassible, then his attributes associated with his creating this world are unchanging. So, God must have been creating the world from all eternity. But then God’s creative (...) act, one might object, seems to be no different from a matter of natural necessity. This is a threat to divine freedom, for God would then have no choice concerning his creative action. Anthony Ruffus and Jon McGinnis argue that this puzzle can be solved in such a way that Avicenna can consistently affirm divine freedom along with divine simplicity. They suggest that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s interpretation might help to show that it is false that Avicenna’s God cannot choose absolutely. For it is still open to him to choose either to create eternally or to refrain from creating anything at all. Ruffus and McGinnis argue that since creating or not creating anything at all do not correspond to two distinct concepts, Avicenna’s account of divine simplicity, which denies any multiplicity in divine mind, is safeguarded along with divine freedom. I claim that God’s omnirationality requiring that he always acts for reasons is a serious threat to such an interpretation. (shrink)

On behalf of the editors of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, I am pleased to introduce the editors and venue of the Symposium on Synthetic Life: Scientific, Historical, and Ethical Perspectives, which occupies much of the current issue of our journal. We are very pleased that Professors Ute Deichmann, Michel Morange, and Anthony S. Travis planned, organized, and edited the proceedings of the workshop on this topic, held on March 5-6, 2012, at the Jacques Loeb Centre for the History (...) and Philosophy of the Life Sciences and the NIBN at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Beer Sheva, Israel.Professor Deichmann has been the founding director of the Centre since it was created in 2007. Although she trained in .. (shrink)

In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. I then (...) took (3) to mean (EP) Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p.1 Now suppose that I am justified in believing anything of the omissive Mooreparadoxical form: (Om) p and I do not believe that p. Then I am justified in believing the first conjunct. So by (EP) I am justified in believing that I believe that p. But since I am also justified in believing the second conjunct, I am justified in believing that I do not believe that p. I claimed that this is impossible, because anything that justifies me in believing that something is the case renders me unjustified in believing that it is not the case. This syllogism is plausible from an externalist view of justification, according to which circumstances such as seeming to see rain under normal perceptual conditions, justify me in believing that it is raining. In support of (1), if my apparent perceptions of rain are reliably connected with rain, so as to justify me in thinking that it is raining, they also tend to make me believe that it is raining. In support of (2), my apparent perceptions of rain are also reliably connected with my coming to believe that it is raining. However, Anthony Brueckner (2006) argues that (1) and (EP) are both false once justification is thought of evidentially. Against (EP), he claims that my evidence that p is not evidence that I believe that p unless I possess the evidence, in the sense that I believe it and were I to believe that p on its basis. (shrink)

An experimenting society is one in which policy-relevant knowledge is created. It is then critically assessed and communicated in real-life or natural settings, with the aim of discovering new forms of public action to improve the problem-solving capacities of society. This latest volume of the distinguished Policy Studies Review Annual series probes, evaluates, and augments the work of Donald T. Campbell on an experimental societies. A basic assumption of this volume is that Campbell's perspective supplies a useful way to address (...) increasingly complex and seemingly unmanageable problems facing the United States and other postindustrial societies. This volume is also the fourteenth festschrift to be issued by Transaction. The focus is on theoretical as well as practical options for creating an experimenting society. The rationale for this focus is the belief, increasingly -shared in the social science and policy-making communities alike, that researchers are essentially ignorant about how to solve many of the most pressing larger problems of this epoch. This frank recognition of ignorance is a prerequisite of genuine scientific and professional curiosity, without which knowledge gains are next to impossible to achieve, and a'precondition of an experimenting society. Contributors to this original volume include: Steve-Fuller, Duncan MacRae, Jr., Anthony S. Bryk, Robert A. Beauregard, Rita Mae Kelly, Peter Gregware, Burkart Holzner, B. Guy Peters, C. West Churchman, and Ian I. Mitroff. Their multidisciplinary competencies are at once philosophical, methodological, and substantive. They address such questions as: What new or bold policies are available in domains such as education, science, and urban development? In what ways can theoretical knowledge and practical action be fused so as to illuminate or alleviate policy problems? What should be done? Included are excerpts from Campbell's foundational paper "The Experimenting Society," as well as a recent article entitled "Methods for the Experimenting Society," which circulated in unpublished form for many years. An unusual feature of the book is Campbell's responses to those who have addressed his work with candor and intelligence. It will be of interest to policy studies scholars, sociologists, and social scientists. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas’s theory of self-knowledge stands out among medieval theories for its conceptual sophistication, yet it remains less studied than many other areas of his thought. Here I consider a significant philosophical critique of Aquinas on self-knowledge and respond to it. Anthony Kenny alleges that Aquinas does not sufficiently account for the individuation of thought in the knower. But Kenny’s analysis of how Aquinas individuates thought ironically confuses Aquinas’s account with that of Averroes, whose explanation Aquinas rejected. A closer (...) reading of Aquinas’s texts reveals that intelligible species, not phantasms, individuate thought. Kenny’s central objection to Aquinas’s account of self-knowledge is thus resolved, but I leave open whether Aquinas’s account could be usefully supplemented by modern treatments of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Japan is a country largely lacking supplies of many essential natural resources including petroleum, coal, and iron ore. As her industrial base and economy expanded during the 1920s and 1930s, Japan's dependence on imports of these resources became increasingly evident. The onset of the Depression in the 1930s further threatened Japan's lifeline, and, in an effort to become economically independent and self-sufficient in natural resources , Japan's militaristic government pursued a policy of territorial expansion. Beginning in 1937, Japan's military forces (...) swept out of Manchuria into China and then into Southeast Asia in search of strategic materials such as petroleum, coal, copper, zinc, and rubber. To achieve independence in petroleum, the Japanese developed a dual approach: they would acquire natural petroleum sources in Southeast Asia and at the same time establish a synthetic fuel industry for the conversion of coal to oil. Actually, the Japanese had begun research on synthetic fuel in the 1920s, only a few years after other countries, such as Germany and Britain, that lacked sources of natural petroleum. They did excellent laboratory research on the coal hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch conversion processes, but in their haste to construct large synthetic fuel plants they bypassed the intermediated pilot-plant stage and failed to make a successful transition from small- to large-scale production. Unable to synthesize liquid fuels from coal, they instead derived significant quantities from the technologically simpler coal carbonization and shale oil distillation processes. In the last year of World War II, the Japanese attempted to revive their synthetic fuel industry and entered into an agreement with IG Farben for technical assistance. Germany's defeat ended this final effort. The Japanese synthetic fuel industry presents a good case study of technological failure. It shows that high-quality basic scientific research does not necessarily translate into large-scale technological success. (shrink)

We investigated the definition, prevalence, perceived prevalence and severity of, as well as justifications for and expected responses to, academic dishonesty at the graduate level in a sample of 246 graduate students, 49 faculty, and 20 administrators. Between 2.5% and 55.1% of students self-reported engaging in academically dishonest behaviors, depending on the nature of the behavior. Students and faculty rated 40 examples of academically dishonest behaviors similarly in terms of severity, but faculty tended to underestimate the prevalence of academic dishonesty. (...) Students and faculty also reported how they would idealistically and realistically expect themselves to respond to cheating situations. Students rated 21 behaviors in terms of their likeliness to increase or decrease academically dishonest behavior. Suggestions are given for developing a climate or culture of academic integrity to address academic dishonesty. (shrink)